Each page exercises one part of the verification rail and keeps its endpoint, observable outcome, simulated inputs, and production limits beside the interaction. The directory does not run anything itself.
Create fresh, purpose-bound Web TLS, eIDAS-profile, mdoc, wallet, vLEI/EUDI relying-party, and QKD identity artifacts in six local lanes; separately verify bundled real GLEIF testnet evidence read-only; reject fourteen boundary attacks; then sign one public evidence manifest. Technical success and external recognition stay separate.
POST /api/sandbox/trust-chain/run
Run a proposed GLEIF and German EUDI Wallet Sandbox scenario: bind a synthetic PID wallet to a controlled vLEI role, issue local reference access and registration artifacts, enforce one registered purpose, then reject root, key, scope, revocation, replay, and signature attacks.
POST /api/sandbox/portable-trust/run
Generate and verify a real Groth16/BN254 proof of
age_over_18, then present the same stand-in holder to two relying parties
and compare their different scoped nullifiers. The date of birth is not disclosed.
POST /verify/age
Create a demo credential offer by QR, then initiate a wallet presentation that asks for an age claim and verifies issuer and holder binding. This standards path does not by itself claim cross-site unlinkability.
POST /api/v1/oid4vci/offer · POST /api/v1/oid4vp/initiate
Issue a synthetic operator credential to an ephemeral embedded wallet, bind its presentation to one fixed mock Quality-on-Demand request, and independently verify the signed receipt. Revocation, altered QoS, and destructive operations fail closed.
POST /api/sandbox/operator-wallet/*
Observe an accepted organizational-role proof and the explicit rejection of foreign-root, tampered-nullifier, replay, and tier-escalation cases.
GET /vlei/zk/demo
Issue a key-bound delegation chain, run two metered purchase attempts, and watch the second fail when the worker crosses its narrower spend cap.
GET /agent/chain/demo
Start from a simulated federated session, bind a real WebAuthn credential, and inspect which assurance axis changes. The flow does not turn a simulated identity source into verified identity evidence.
/onramp/login → /binding/challenge → /passkey/enroll → /stepup
Evaluate a bundled synthetic authorization sample and inspect the signed policy receipt. No wallet presentation is received, no SCA is performed, and no money moves.
GET /verify/payment/demo
Check an instrument signature, separate calibration record, technician scope and holder proof, asset/work-order challenge, freshness, coverage, and replay before issuing a minimised receipt.
GET /verify/inspection/demo
Compare a dated, GET-only OBP public-catalogue checkpoint with the separate synthetic payment control: approve, wallet step-up, or decline, then inspect adaptive promotion, rollback, and attack controls.
GET /api/sandbox/gftn-sme/evidence · POST /run · /adaptive
Inspect how separate fraud and early-loss heads feed a signed, transaction-bound approve, step-up, or decline decision and a reviewable model promotion path. The computational control room remains gated.
The pages above call the listed same-origin endpoints. A successful runner result is shown only after the endpoint returns. Each page states whether its credentials, keys, upstream identity, sensor input, or business data are synthetic, self-minted, test-ecosystem, or partner-gated.
The demos do not confer issuer trust, eIDAS qualification, OIDF certification, GLEIF adoption, regulated payment participation, hardware provenance, or production model validation. Those are separate governance, partner, or operational milestones.